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Abstract 
 
Economists have reached a consensus that central bank could improve its policy efficiency by 
following a monetary policy rule. Given that money supply is the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
principal policy instrument and its monetary targeting regime, this paper utilizes counterfactual 
simulation method to evaluate the feasibility of McCallum rule as a policy guideline for China in two 
simple macroeconomic models. The simulation results show that following McCallum rule could 
significantly reduce China’s nominal GDP fluctuations.  The analysis shows that rule-specified path 
for the monetary base changes could be used as a benchmark for PBC’s policy decision. 
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1. Introduction 
The long-run objectives of monetary policy are 
low inflation and stable growth of real output 
at full employment. The question on how a 
central bank fulfills its long-run monetary 
policy objectives, whether following a policy 
rule or with discretion has been debatable since 
Simons’ seminal paper in 1936.  Research in 
macroeconomics provides many reasons why 
monetary policy should be evaluated and 
conducted as a policy rule rather than as a one-
time change in policy. First, the literature on 
time-inconsistency shows that without 
commitment to a rule, policymakers will be 
tempted to choose a suboptimal inflation 
policy that will result in a higher average 
inflation rate and no lower unemployment than 
if a rule is followed in choosing a policy (see 
Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 
1983). Second, credibility about monetary 
policy appears to improve its performance; 
sticking to a policy rule increases the 
credibility about future policy action. In 
addition, policy rules help market participants 
forecast future policy decisions and therefore 
reduce uncertainty. Policy rules increase 
accountability and potentially require 
policymakers to account for the difference 
between their actions and the rules (Taylor, 
1998). The well-known simple policy rules1 in 
                                                 
1 The simple policy rules refer to simple feedback 
instrument rule, relative to fully optimal rules 
derived from the first order conditions of the central 
bank’s welfare maximization subject to the 
economic situation in which the monetary policy 
rule operates (Kalin 2002). 
the past decades are Taylor and McCallum 
rules following the non-active constant growth 
rate rule supported by Friedman (1959) and 
Lucas (1980). A major advantage of 
McCallum rule over Taylor rule is that 
McCallum rule does not include unobservable 
variables such as the real interest rate and the 
output gap.  
McCallum rule is much less prominent than 
Taylor’s rule, primarily because central banks 
in industrial countries focus on interest rate 
instead of monetary base growth rates in 
designing their policy (McCallum, 2002a).  
The new Keynesian Taylor rule noted that a 
central bank follows an interest rate target and 
ignores monetary aggregate (Cochrane, 2007). 
McCallum rule is a nominal income target rule 
with a monetary base as its policy instrument. 
Taylor (2000a) claims that a monetary base or 
some other monetary aggregate can still be a 
reasonable monetary instrument in emerging 
economies. Beck and Weiland (2008) also 
support the importance of a monetary base 
variable in policy-making.  In regards to the 
feasibility of adopting monetary policy rules in 
emerging economies, Meltzer (1995) and 
Taylor (2000) state that policy rules are 
applicable both to countries with and without 
developed financial markets. Since money 
supply is still a dominant policy instrument 
under the monetary targeting regime in China, 
the McCallum rule appears to be an 
appropriate choice for China’s central bank. 
Using the counterfactual simulation method, 
supplemented by historical analysis method, 
this study investigates whether the McCallum 
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rule can be a useful policy guideline for 
China’s central bank to improve its policy 
performance. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  
The next section reviews the principles of 
McCallum rule and its improvements. Section 
3 describes the counterfactual simulation 
method and section 4 discusses the data 
sources. Section 5 reports the empirical results 
and section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Principles of McCallum Rule 
McCallum (1987, 1993, 2006) advocates a 
policy rule for central banks to follow in 
setting monetary policy. The rule, developed 
outside the confine of a single model, would 
work well with different economic models, 
since it is free from the model-specific 
problem. Since macroeconomists disagreed 
about the forces that drive the economy, they 
are unlikely to come up with an optimal rule 
for the operation of the monetary policy (Stark, 
1996). McCallum rule requires central banks to 
target the growth rate of nominal GDP using 
the monetary base as its instrument.  
According to McCallum (1984, 1985, 1987), 
four principles should be followed in designing 
a monetary rule. First, the rule should dictate 
the behavior of a variable that the monetary 
authority can control directly and/or accurately. 
Second, the rule should not rely on the 
presumed absence of regulatory changes and 
technical progress in the financial industries. 
Third, neither money stock nor (nominal) 
interest rate paths2  are important for their own 
sake; these variables are relevant only to the 
extent that they are useful in facilitating good 
performance in the magnitudes of inflation and 
output or employment. Fourth, a well-designed 
rule should recognize the limits of 
macroeconomics knowledge. In particular, it 
should recognize that neither theory nor 
evidence points convincingly to any of the 
numerous competing models of the interaction 
of nominal and real variables. 
Based on the four principles, McCallum (1987) 
specifies a target path for nominal GDP using 
the monetary base as the operational 
mechanism, a variable that can be accurately 
set on a daily basis by the central bank with a 
floating exchange rate. Specifically, the rule 
“would adjust the base growth rate each month 
or quarter, increasing the rate if nominal GDP 
is below its target path and vice versa” 
(McCallum, 1984, p. 390). In 1993, McCallum 
                                                 
2In Macroeconomics, the word “path” describes the 
locus of a variable changes over time. 
revised the rule using the nominal GDP growth 
rate instead of the nominal GDP as the target, 
supported by Stark and Croushore (1996).  In 
algebraic form, the McCallum rule is: 
* *( )1 1B X VB X Xt t t t tλΔ = Δ − Δ + Δ − Δ− −  (1) 
Where all the variables are in logarithms,  is 
the monetary base, 
B
VBΔ  is the average base 
velocity growth rate over the previous four 
years, λ is the monetary response factor, and 
X is the log of nominal GDP. The asterisk (* ) 
denotes the target growth rate, which is the 
sum of the inflation rate and the long-run 
average real GDP growth rate.  
The growth of the monetary base is determined 
by the three terms on the right-hand side of 
equation (1). The first term sets the monetary 
base growth rate equal to the desired rate of 
inflation plus the potential or desired real GDP 
growth rate. McCallum emphasized real, since 
outputs and employments levels over longer 
spans of time will be independent of the 
average growth rate of the nominal variables 
(McCallum 1988, p.175). The second term on 
the right-hand side of equation (1) is the 
growth rate of monetary base velocity, which 
reflects the impact of technological and 
regulatory changes on the velocity of the 
monetary base. In this regard, McCallum rule 
forecasts the average growth rate of velocity 
over the future. This term helps to prevent the 
price level from drifting in response to a 
permanent shock to money demand. With the 
velocity growing at a steady-state rate and the 
nominal GDP growth rate equal to its target, 
the rule forces the inflation rate to remain at a 
desired level, assuming that the monetary 
policy is neutral in the long run.  The last term 
on the right-hand side of equation (1) is the 
most important term for stabilization of output 
and price level, which suggests the monetary 
policy authority to adjust monetary base 
growth whenever the nominal GDP growth 
rate differs from its target. When the nominal 
GDP growth rate is below its target, the 
monetary authority should temporarily 
increase monetary base growth and vice versa.  
The first feature of the McCallum rule prefers 
nominal GDP to monetary aggregates such as 
M1 or M2, as the monetary authority’s 
principal target variable.  Monetary aggregates 
have become unreliable guides and the 
nominal GDP correlates with the real GDP and 
inflation. In addition, the nominal GDP has 
two other features that would make it a good 
guide for policy in principle. First, under the 
nominal GDP targeting, the monetary policy 
would adjust to offset disturbances to 
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aggregate demand. A second attractive feature 
of the nominal GDP targeting is that it would 
help the policy maker balance the goals of 
stable output growth and inflation in response 
to aggregate supply disturbance (Clark, 1994). 
Furthermore, the nominal GDP is preferred to 
real GDP as the policy target because a central 
bank cannot control or predict with accuracy 
how the nominal GDP growth divides on a 
quarter-by-quarter basis between real growth 
and inflation (McCallum, 1988).   
The second feature of McCallum rule is the 
specification of a constant growth target for 
nominal income, rather than a target rate that 
varies over the cycle. In this way, it would at 
least eliminate policy surprises as a source of 
undesirable fluctuations arising from the 
central bank’s pursuit of an optimal policy 
decision. The third feature of McCallum rule is 
to utilize monetary base instead of interest rate 
as a monetary policy instrument. McCallum in 
his 1993 paper discussed in detail the reasons 
why he prefers monetary base to interest rate 
as a policy instrument.  McCallum argues that 
if the nominal interest rate is use as an 
indicator of monetary policy stance, then 
tightening or easing the policy stance results in 
ambiguity.  In this regards, the rule is desirably 
operational, since the central bank is capable 
of controlling the monetary base variable with 
accuracy. 
A technical issue regarding McCallum rule is 
whether the behavior of the base growth target 
specified by the rule is permissible for the base 
growth to be of use in practice. McCallum 
(2006) suggests using the average nominal 
GDP growth over the past 4 quarters instead of 
the most recent quarter for the rule’s final term 
(this is analogous to the Taylor rule’s use of an 
average four-quarter inflation rate value). The 
McCallum rule that uses the average nominal 
GDP growth over the past four quarters for the 
final term is refer as the improved (McCallum) 
rule in this study.  We evaluate the original and 
improved McCallum rule separately.  
Several studies have used the counterfactual or 
stochastic simulation method to test the 
robustness of McCallum’s rule. Based on 
seasonally adjusted US quarterly data for 
1954Q1 - 1985Q4, McCallum (1988) verified 
the rule using two single equation models, 
regressing nominal income growth rate on the 
current or one-period lagged monetary base 
growth rate, and one-period lagged nominal 
income growth rate. However, these two single 
equation models used to depict nominal 
income determination are simple and likely to 
be policy invariant. McCallum further verified 
the robustness of his simple rule to an 
atheoretic VAR model and structural classical 
and Keynesian slant model. The simulation 
results show that adherence to monetary base-
growth rates specified in equation (1) would 
have yielded essentially the desired inflation, 
despite the financial and regulatory changes 
during the testing period, while reducing the 
extent of cyclical fluctuation in nominal 
income. In McCallum’s latter papers (1993, 
1999, 2000), similar models were used to 
further verify the robustness of the rule based 
on data from different countries. In these 
papers, McCallum adopted a nominal target of 
the growth-rate type, rather than the growing-
level type used in his prior research. The main 
disadvantage with a level-type target path is 
that the target variable is revert back to the 
preset path after any disturbance that has 
driven it away, even if the effect of the 
disturbance is of a permanent nature. Since 
such an action entails general macroeconomic 
stimulus or restraints, this type of targeting 
procedure would tend to induce extra cyclical 
variability in demand conditions, which 
implies extra variability in real output if price 
level stickiness prevails (McCallum, 1999, p. 
1498).  
Hall (1990), Judd and Motley (1991, 1993), 
Dueker (1993), Stark and Croushore (1996), 
Philip (2000), and Razzak (2003) present 
supportive evidence of McCallum rule based 
on data from different developed countries 
using simulation methods. Stark and 
Croushore (1996, p. 3) in their study encourage 
researchers to use models in which monetary 
policy has real effects. For this reason, they 
excluded the real business cycle models and 
rational expectations models from this study 
because the real effects of monetary policy in 
these models tend to be nonexistent or very 
small. . Stark and Croushore (1996) examine 
the effectiveness of McCallum rule using a 
Keynesian model, a reduced form model and a 
structural VAR model. They conclude that 
McCallum rule is a potentially useful rule for 
setting monetary policy.  
The historical analytical method developed by 
Stuart (1996) and Taylor (1999) consist of 
contrasting actual setting of instrument 
variables during some historical time span with 
the values specified by particular rules in 
response to prevailing conditions. 
Discrepancies or agreements between rule-
specified and the actual values can then be 
evaluated in light of ex-post judgments 
concerning the merit of the various rules. 
Stuart (1996) compared McCallum rule with 
the monetary policy decisions based on a 
thorough assessment of the prospect for 
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inflation using UK data for the period 1985Q1-
1962Q2. The author found that the simple rule 
provides information about inflation and 
economic activity, which can be used with 
other relevant information in the formulation 
of monetary policy. 
Taylor (1999) examines the US monetary 
history for two different periods: 1880-1914 
versus 1955-1997, using the framework 
specified by Taylor rule. The author concludes 
that the historical approach to monetary policy 
evaluation complements the model-based 
approach and that case studies are useful for 
judging how much discretion is appropriate 
when a policy rule is use as a guideline for 
central bank policy decisions. McCallum 
(2000) follow Stuart-Taylor method on the US 
and UK from early 1960s to 1998 and for 
Japan from 1970s extending through 1998. 
McCallum concludes that the Stuart–Taylor 
method can also be a useful approach to 
McCallum rule evaluation in addition to 
simulations with structural models. 
McCallum rule is currently less popular than 
Taylor rule in developed countries, but it has 
attracted attention of some researchers who 
have great interest in China’s monetary policy. 
Some researchers have tried to test McCallum 
policy rule to identify a guideline for the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC). For example, 
Burdekin and Siklos (2005) apply McCallum 
rule to model Chinese monetary policy using 
the coefficient specified by McCallum and 
then allowing the data to determine the 
coefficient estimates. Based on the simulated 
values for the nominal GDP growth rate, the 
authors concluded that the PBC had appeared 
to response to the gap between the target and 
the actual nominal GDP and China’s inflation 
and monetary policy outcomes could be 
satisfactorily modeled using standard empirical 
techniques instead of a figment of China-
specific “structural” factors. However, Liu and 
Zhang (2007) compare the fit of the modified 
McCallum rule using monetary base or M2 as 
the dependent variable with the actual realized 
values for money supply. The authors conclude 
that a quantity of money rule in the spirit of 
McCallum could not depict the PBC’s policy 
stance adequately.   
Following the estimation of the standard 
McCallum rule and a modified McCallum rule, 
Kong (2008) concludes that the two estimated 
McCallum rules reflect the trend of the actual 
base money growth rate,. Thus, it is useful to 
utilize the McCallum rule as a guideline for 
China’s monetary policy. Tuuli et al (2008) 
analyze China’s monetary policy after 1994 
using a quantity-based McCallum rule. By 
testing the excess money supply (deviation of 
the actual money supply growth from the value 
given by McCallum rule), the authors suggest 
that the McCallum rule can be a useful tool for 
analyzing the monetary policy stance and for 
providing information about inflationary 
pressures in the Chinese economy.  
However, some unaddressed issues remain in 
these studies. First, Liu and Zhang (2007) and 
Tuuli et al, (2008) studies adopted the 
McCallum’s specified coefficient value of 0.5 
for the monetary response factor based on the 
Japanese data for the period 1972-1992. In 
addition, a 4 percent long-term average annual 
growth rate of real output is used as the target 
growth rate in the rule when conducting the 
simulation to decide on the coefficient value 
(McCallum 1993).  On the other hand, 
McCallum rule coefficient value of 0.25 is 
base on the US data for the period 1954:Q1-
1985:Q4. A three percent long-term average 
annual growth rate of real output is used as the 
target growth rate in the rule when identifying 
the coefficient value (McCallum 1987, 1988). 
Therefore, to test the validity of McCallum 
rule using Chinese data, a researcher should 
take into account the variation in the value 
for λ . Second, Kong (2008) evaluates a 
modified McCallum rule, with the inflation 
gap (the difference between inflation target 
and realized value) added into the rule as an 
independent variable. However, the author 
neglected the fact that the feedback term 
defined in McCallum rule is the nominal GDP 
growth which gives equal weight to changes in 
the real output gap and deviations of inflation 
from the target. Furthermore, Tuuli et al (2008) 
uses 
2M  as the dependent variable to test the 
effectiveness of McCallum rule in China. This 
ignores the fundamental principle of 
McCallum rule that the instrument variable 
should be under the central bank’s direct 
control.   
3. Simulation Procedure and 
Macroeconomic Condition Model 
Following McCallum (1987, 2002a), this study 
utilizes counterfactual simulation method to 
evaluate the feasibility of McCallum rule to 
achieve a nominal GDP growth rate target in 
China. If the application of the rule in place of 
actual historical policy yields smoother 
nominal GDP paths than those actually 
experienced, we can conclude the rule perform 
well. In order to calculate the performance of 
the McCallum rule in minimizing deviations 
around a given target path for nominal GDP, 
we need to specify the macroeconomic 
conditions in which the policy rule will work. 
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McCallum (1988, 1993) and Stark and 
Croushore (1996) documented the robustness 
of the rule by testing it across different models. 
The simple reduced-form type models used by 
McCallum (1988, 1993, 2002a) provided the 
results that are quite comparable to those 
produced with small but somewhat more 
complex structure models used in his studies. 
Additionally, Hall (1990), Hafer et al (1991, 
1996) and Philip (2000) used the single 
equation models to evaluate McCallum rules.  
In this study, we first replicate a single 
equation macroeconomic model used by 
McCallum (2002a) that specifies the 
relationship between the nominal GDP growth 
and monetary base growth. This model 
provides a basic macroeconomic condition to 
evaluate the possible effectiveness of 
McCallum rule using China’s data. The model 
is given as follows: 
ttttt BXXX 11322110 εββββ +Δ+Δ+Δ+=Δ −−−   (2) 
Where  and  denote logarithms of the 
nominal GDP and the monetary base, 
respectively.  and 
tX tB
tXΔ tBΔ  are quarterly growth 
rates. t1ε is disturbance term.  
To avoid the reverse-causation problem, 
equation (2) excluded the  term (Sims, 
1980; King and Plosser, 1982). This method 
avoids the real sector that drives the monetary 
sector, in contrast to the traditional view of 
monetary movements as business cycle 
impulse. Furthermore, it is common that 
monetary policy operates with variable lags on 
the economy (Blinder, 1998, p.13).  Equation 
(2) introduces a full two-quarter lag between 
the target departures and corrective 
effects, which reflect the causal direction. 
Before conducting the simulation, we first 
estimate the parameters and residuals of 
equation (2) over the study period, with the 
residuals capturing shocks to the economy. 
Then, we use the McCallum rule given by 
equation (1) and the initial actual values of 
GDP growth and monetary base growth to 
determine a simulated value for monetary base 
growth. With a simulated monetary base 
growth, we can then use equation (2) to obtain 
a simulated value for nominal GDP, which 
feed into the equation. The root–mean–
squared-error (RMSE) is used to measure the 
deviations of the simulated and actual values 
of the nominal GDP from the targets. The 
RMSE is given as follows:  
tBΔ
*
1 1X Xt tΔ − Δ− −
  ∑ Δ−Δ= nXXRMSE tt /)( 2*   
A floating exchange rate regime is necessary in 
McCallum’s view for the monetary policy rule 
to work effectively (1987, p. 13). Given 
China’s managed floating exchange rate 
regime, we extend equation (2) by adding an 
exchange rate variable to test the rule’s 
robustness, namely,  
0 1 1 2 2 3
         4 1 2
X X Xt t t
St t
1Btβ β β β
β ε
Δ = + Δ + Δ + Δ− −
+ Δ +−
−  (3) 
Where  denotes the log of the real effective 
exchange rate, with an increase in implying 
a devaluation of the Chinese currency. 
tS
tS
4. Data and Methodology 
Data used in this study include GDP target and 
real effective exchange rate covering 1994:Q1 
to 2009:Q1, and monetary base and nominal 
GDP covering 1990:Q1 to 2009:Q1.  We 
choose 1994 as the starting year since the third 
phrase of China economic reforms where the 
official and market exchange rates were 
unified and current account transactions were 
liberalized. In addition, the banking reform 
included the establishment of three policy 
(non-commercial) banks and separating policy 
finance from more commercially oriented 
activities.  In the same year, the PBC started 
the monetary targeting regime – using M2 as 
the intermediate target.  
To construct the time series for   (average 
value of previous four years) starting from 
1994:Q2 (
VBΔ
MBNGDPVB /= 3 ), we use the 
monetary base and nominal GDP data from 
1990:Q1. However, officially released 
quarterly data for monetary base is only 
available from 1993:Q1 (The People’s Bank of 
China Quarterly Statistical Bulletin). Therefore, 
we utilize annually data for monetary base and 
M1 from International Financial statistics (IFS) 
to calculate the money multiplier for the period 
1990-1992. Based on the obtained money 
multiplier and officially released quarterly data 
for M1 from 1990:Q1 to 1992:Q4, we obtained 
the quarterly data for the monetary base from 
1990:Q1 to 1992:Q4.  
Another important time series in McCallum 
rule is the nominal GDP target but is 
unavailable for China since the Chinese 
government only released the annual real GDP 
target instead of annual nominal GDP target. 
McCallum used the sum of the average long-
run real GDP growth rate and the target 
inflation rate as a proxy for the nominal GDP 
                                                 
3 NGDP and MB stand for nominal GDP and 
Monetary base in level. 
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target. In China, the government announces a 
real GDP target and a RPI or CPI inflation 
target every year in the Report on the 
implementation of the plan for National 
Economic and Social Development and on the 
Protocol for National Economic and Social 
development. Although the RPI or CPI 
inflation rate is not exactly equal to the GDP 
deflator inflation rate, we preferred the former 
to the latter, since the GDP deflator is a 
realized value not a target value.  Furthermore, 
we do not know how current changes in GDP 
divide into the GDP deflator and real output 
growth. Before 1997, the Chinese government 
announced a RPI inflation rate target instead of 
the CPI inflation rate target, and started to 
announce a RPI and CPI inflation target rate 
simultaneously between 1998 and 2000.  The 
annual CPI inflation target rate, which only 
became available from 2001, exceeded the 
annual RPI inflation target rate for the same 
period by two percent.  
To construct a complete time series for CPI 
inflation target, we add two percentage points 
onto the RPI inflation target rate for 1994-1997 
to approximate the CPI inflation target values 
for the period. Following this, we add the CPI 
inflation target rate to the officially announced 
real GDP target growth rate to obtain a time 
series for the annual nominal GDP growth rate 
target.  The annual values for the nominal GDP 
growth target rate are interpolated into 
quarterly values using the following formula: 
1)1( 4/1 −+= arQr  (4)  
Where ar denotes annual growth rate and Qr  
is the interpolated quarterly growth rate.  
Data on the exchange rate (quarterly average 
real effective exchange rate) is obtain from the 
Bank for International settlement (BIS) 
monthly average real effective exchange rate 
using the simple average method with the year 
2005 equal to 100.  
Before estimating equations (2) and (3), we 
first perform the unit root test for the time 
series variables to avoid spurious regressions. 
The results of Augmented Dicker-Fuller (ADF) 
for monetary base growth rate ( ), monetary 
base velocity change rate ( ), nominal GDP 
growth rate (
BΔ
VBΔ
XΔ ), real effective exchange rate 
change rate ( ) and Phillips-Perron (PP) test 
for and   are reported in Table 1. The 
ADF- test results show that 
SΔ
BΔ VBΔ
XΔ  and SΔ  are 
stationary at 1% level, while BΔ and VBΔ are 
stationary at 10% and 5% level respectively. 
We also conduct a PP unit root test for the 
variables and the results show they are 
stationary at 1% level.               
5. Empirical results  
Before conducting the simulation, we first 
estimate equations (2) and (3). The estimated 
result of equation (2) is given as:  
0.0474 0.552 0.2261 2
 (2.506)  (-4.234)           (-1.717)
         0.431 1 3
            (1.186)
X Xt t
t val
Bt tε
Δ = − Δ − ΔXt− −
−
+ Δ +−
 (5)  
251.02 =R   ˆ 0.091σ =        
Breusch Godfrey(BG) test
      0.737( ,0.539)P value
−
= −  
where t3ε   is the residual, i.e. the estimated 
disturbance for period t. The simulated values 
for  and 
tBΔ tXΔ  were calculated for 60 periods 
using equation (1) and (5), with the initial 
conditions equal to the 1994:Q2 values and 
with t3ε  values fed in as the shock estimates 
for each period. Table 2 reports the results of 
this simulation exercise with the different λ  
values. The study uses RMSE to choose the λ  
value to verify if McCallum rule can be a 
guideline for Chinese monetary policy.  
Since a smaller RMSE means a better 
performance, the RMSE values in Table 2 
suggest that adopting McCallum rule (1) or 
rule (2) would have dramatically improved the 
macroeconomic performance, comparing to the 
actual performance in the absence of following 
a rule. Furthermore, using the nominal GDP 
growth rate of the most recent quarter in the 
rule’s final term,  increases 
when
)( * XXRMSE Δ−Δ
λ   increases (point of the sentence?). We 
obtained similar results when the average 
nominal GDP growth rate over the past 4 
quarters is included in the rule’s final term. 
Rule (2) is slightly superior to rule (1). Next, 
we check the performance of McCallum rule in 
the macroeconomic condition specified in 
equation (6) - the regression result of equation 
(3), so that we can robustly identify which rule 
is better and what value to assign to λ . 
1 2
1 1 4
   0.0470 0.5689 0.2635
 (2.509)  (-4.388)          (-1.987)
        0.4863 0.345        (6)
             (1.302)          (0.701)
t t
t t t
X X
t value
B S ε
− −
− −
Δ = − Δ − Δ
−
+ Δ + +
tX
  
ˆ 0.091σ =         27.02 =R
)529.0,(401.0BG test valueP −=  
The simulated values for  and  were 
calculated using equations (1) and (6) for 60 
tBΔ tXΔ
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periods, with the actual 1994:Q2 values as the 
initial conditions and with the 4tε  values fed in 
as the shock estimates for each period.  Table 3 
presents the simulation results.  
Comparing the value in 
Table 3, we find that the macroeconomic 
performance greatly improved by adopting a 
policy rule. In addition, the value for 
 ascends when 
)( * XXRMSE Δ−Δ
)( * XXRMSE Δ−Δ λ  
increases, regardless of rule (1) or rule (2) 
being adopted, and rule (2) is slightly superior 
to rule (1) when λ  is bigger than 0.2.  
The simulated results in Table 2 and 3 clearly 
show that adopting McCallum rule could 
significantly improve Chinese monetary policy 
performance. To identify the stability property 
of the rule with different values for λ , we 
depict the target GDP growth rate together 
with simulated GDP growth rates in Figures 1, 
2, 3 and 4. Explosive oscillation does not 
appear, but the band of oscillation gets wider 
with an increase in the value of λ  as shown in 
the four figures. The improved base rule is 
slightly better than the original base rule as a 
monetary policy guideline. Thus, for the 
stability of nominal economic growth, we 
decide on rule (2) as Chinese monetary policy 
guideline with λ  =2, which is similar to 
McCallum results based on US data (1987, 
1988, 1993). When 2.0=λ , the original and 
improved rules produce equal 
in macroeconomic 
condition specified by equation (6), and 
produce approximately equal 
 in condition specified by 
equation (5).  
)( * XXRMSE Δ−Δ
)( * XXRMSE Δ−Δ
This study has demonstrated how well 
McCallum rule could describe China’s 
monetary policy using a counterfactual 
simulation method. Next, we follow Stuart 
(1996) and Taylor (1999) historical analysis 
method to further assess whether McCallum 
rule would have provided useful information 
about the policy stance in specific economic 
situations. We test whether past policy errors 
can be identified by observing the divergence 
of actual policy from the paths implied by the 
rule based on historical data (rather than 
simulation). This method looks at the trend in 
actual policy rather than to compare point 
estimates. Figure 5 shows the path for actual 
historical monetary base quarterly growth rate 
and the path for the rule-specified (rule (2) 
where 2.0=λ ) monetary base quarterly 
growth rate between 1994:Q2 and 2009:Q1. 
The actual monetary base growth rate showed 
an upward trend between 1995:Q1 and 
1996:Q4, but the rule-specified base growth 
rate displayed a downward trend (see Figure 5). 
During this period, China experienced high 
annual inflation rates, 16.9 and 8.3 percent in 
1995 and 1996 respectively. Between 1997:Q1 
and 2001:Q4, the actual base growth rate in 
most cases is below the rule generated base 
growth rate, and in many occasions, the actual 
momentary base growth rate demonstrates 
negative values. During this period, China 
experienced a deflation with an annual 
inflation rate of -0.8, -1.4, 0.3, and 0.5 percent 
in the four years, respectively. During the 
period 2003 to 2008, the actual base growth 
rate is above the rule-specified base growth 
rate in most cases. Inflation rate ascended and 
reached 5.9% in 2008. The actual monetary 
base growth rate oscillates around the rule-
specified growth rate during the study period. 
Using McCallum rule as a benchmark, when 
China’s monetary policy is too restrictive, the 
Chinese economy experienced deflation 
problem; when the actual policy is too 
expansionary, the Chinese economy ran into an 
inflation cycle.  
The peaks and troughs of the actual monetary 
base growth rates in Figure 5 result from the 
policy adjustments shocks. The Chinese 
government implemented a tight monetary 
policy to reduce high inflation from the second 
half of 1993. Following a successful control 
over the price level and the local government 
investment impulse in the first half of 1996, a 
relatively expansionary policy was adopted by 
lowering the benchmark interest rate in May 
1996. The first peak appeared in 1996:Q3 is 
regarded as the rebound of money supply. The 
second peak appeared in 1998:Q1 is the result 
of a series of policy actions to stimulate the 
economy, such as removal of the imposition on 
credit rationing in state-owned commercial 
banks, and performing more open market 
operations to increase money supply.   
The transitory effect followed by a trough in 
1998:Q2 results from a dramatically decrease 
in China export demand and therefore the 
aggregate demand.  After four years of 
deflation, increase in government investment 
in infrastructure and real estate as well as the 
increase in the official wages led to the third 
peak at the beginning of 2002. Another trough 
appears in 2002:Q2 because of the call-back 
adjustment and the rise in the rate of reserve 
requirement in June 2002. From then on, the 
Chinese economy recovered and started a 
gradual increase in price level.  The big gap 
between the actual monetary base growth rate 
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and the rule-generated monetary base growth 
rate during the 2006:Q2 – 2008:Q3 is the result 
of expansionary monetary policy (the negative 
real deposit interest rates) and the increasing 
funds outstanding for foreign exchange. 
Chinese foreign exchange reserve increased 
from US$ 9,411.15 billions to US$ 19,055.85 
billions during the 2006:Q2 – 2008:Q3.  
6. Conclusion  
This study employs the counterfactual 
simulation method to verify whether 
McCallum rule could be used as a monetary 
policy guideline for China during the period 
1994:Q1 through 2009:Q1. To confirm the 
robustness of our empirical results, we employ 
two simple macroeconomic models to specify 
the macroeconomic conditions for the rule to 
operate. The first model followed the 
McCallum framework, and the second is a 
revised model with exchange rate variable 
taking into consideration the influence of 
China’s managed floating exchange rate 
regime on monetary policy.  
The study simulated monetary base growth and 
the nominal GDP growth paths. The simulation 
results show the between 
the target nominal GDP growth rate and the 
simulated nominal GDP growth rate is much 
smaller than the target nominal GDP growth 
rate and actual historical nominal GDP growth 
rate. With similar value for monetary policy 
response factor, the performance of the 
improved rule is slightly better. A smaller 
value for the monetary response factor in 
McCallum rule is more appropriate in the case 
of China. The simulated nominal GDP growth 
rate is much closer to the target nominal GDP 
growth rate with a smaller monetary response 
factor than with a bigger monetary response 
factor. Bigger monetary response factor results 
in wider economic growth oscillation. In 
addition, this study followed Stuart (1996) 
method to check the validity of McCallum rule 
as a monetary policy guideline in China. The 
result shows the rule-specified path of 
monetary base growth rate could be a 
monetary policy guideline for China. 
Therefore, we recommend the PCB’s could use 
McCallum rule as an illustrative benchmark 
instead of strictly following the simple 
McCallum rule. According to Taylor (2000b) 
and McCallum’s (2002b, p.1) studies, a central 
bank should not mechanically follow a policy 
rule in a “mechanical-looking algebraic form.  
Instead, policy makers should use the rule as a 
policy guideline or benchmark in making 
policies.  
)( * XXRMSE Δ−Δ
A limitation in our study is the use of a single 
equation to specify the macroeconomic 
condition to evaluate the feasibility of 
McCallum rule as a monetary policy guideline 
for China.  A possible extension of this study 
is to evaluate McCallum rule in structural 
models that specify more complex 
macroeconomic situation for the rule to 
operate. The extension can complement results 
in this study and further verify the robustness 
of this study results. Another limitation is that 
we do not utilize a constant value for the 
nominal GDP target variable, as McCallum 
rule has specified. This is because the Chinese 
government announces a real GDP target and a 
price level target every year and the values 
change from time to time.    
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Table 1    Result of Unit Root Test 
Variable              (C,T,K)     ADF-test       1%                    5%     10% 
BΔ   (C,0,2)  -2.6812        -3.522    -.2.9017   -2.5882* 
VBΔ   (C,0,2)  -2.9514        -3.548    -2.9126**   -2.5940 
XΔ   (C,0,0)  -13.3297      -3.520***          -2.9006   -2.5876 
SΔ   (C,0,0)  -5.2241        -3.546***          -2.9117   -2.5935 
Variable            (C,T,B)  PP-test       1% 
BΔ   (C,T, 5)  -7.5523   -3.5203*** 
VBΔ   (C,T, 3)  -4.0416   -3.5460*** 
C, T, K, B stands for constant, linear trend, the lag-length (based on SIC), bandwidth (Newey-
West using Barlett Kernel) respectively   ***, **,* stands for 1, 5, 10 per cent significant level 
respectively. 
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Table 2.  Simulation Results (using Equation (5)) 
Policy       )( * XXRMSE Δ−Δ
_____________________________________________________________________
Actual Historical  0.10168 
_____________________________________________________________________
Rule (1)  0=λ  1.0=λ  2.0=λ    3.0=λ      5.0=λ     7.0=λ     1=λ  
                       0.02102       0.02104         0.02114      0.02131    0.02192       0.02293     0.02561 
_____________________________________________________________________
Rule (2)                        0.02100      0.02107     0.02121      0.02174       0.02256     0.02427      
Rule (1) refers to the rule using the lag-one nominal GDP value in the final term. 
Rule (2) uses the average nominal GDP growth rate over the past four quarters.  
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Table 3. Simulation Results (using Equation (6)) 
Policy        )( * XXRMSE Δ−Δ
_____________________________________________________________________
Actual Historical   0.10168 
_____________________________________________________________________
Rule (1)  0=λ    2.0=λ            5.0=λ        7.0=λ        1=λ  
                          0.0225                     0.0228            0.0240            0.0255          0.0301 
_____________________________________________________________________
Rule (2)              0.0225                        0.0228            0.0238           0.0250           0.0272    
Rule (1) refers to the rule using the lag-one nominal GDP value in the final term. 
Rule (2) uses the average nominal GDP growth rate over the past four quarters.  
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Figure 1. Results from simulation with alternative values of λ for rule (1) using equation (5) 
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Figure 2.  Results from simulation with alternative values of for rule (2) using equation (5) 
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Figure 3. Results from simulation with alternative values of for rule (1) using equation (6) 
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Figure 4. Results from simulation with alternative values of for rule (2) using equation (6) 
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
TARGDP SIMUGDP
lam=0.2
 
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
TARGDP SIMUGDP
lam=0.5
 
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
TARGDP SIMUGDP
lam=1
 
 
 
 
 
 17
Figure 5.  McCallum Rule for Monetary Base 
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